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Abstract
We investigate the combination between causal/zero-delay source
coding and information-theoretic secrecy. Two source coding models
with secrecy constraints are considered. We start by considering zero-
delay perfectly secret lossless transmission of a memoryless source. We
derive bounds on the key rate and coding rate needed for perfect zero-
delay secrecy. In this setting, we consider two models which differ by
the ability of the eavesdropper to parse the bit-stream passing from
the encoder to the legitimate decoder into separate messages. We
also consider causal source coding with a fidelity criterion and side
information at the decoder and the eavesdropper. Unlike the zero-delay
setting where variable-length coding is traditionally used but might
leak information on the source through the length of the codewords, in
this setting, since delay is allowed, block coding is possible. We show
that in this setting, separation of encryption and causal source coding
is optimal.
Index Terms: Source coding, Zero-delay, Secrecy, Causal source cod-
ing, Rate-Distortion, Side Information
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1 Introduction
We consider several source coding problems with secrecy constraints, in
which an encoder, referred to as Alice, transmits the output of a memoryless
source to a decoder, referred to as Bob. The communication between Alice
and Bob is intercepted by an eavesdropper, referred to as Eve. A secret key
is shared between Alice and Bob with which they can respectively encrypt
and decrypt the transmission. Attention is restricted to zero-delay and
causal settings. Our setting represents time-critical applications, like live
multimedia streaming, which need to be transmitted or stored securely so
that the contents can be revealed only to authorized parties. Although there
is vast literature dealing with source coding with secrecy constraints, as well
as works that deal with source coding with delay or causality constraints,
very little attention was given in the information theory literature to the
combination of those problem areas.
This paper has two main sections. We start with zero-delay source cod-
ing and include secrecy constraints. Our goal is to characterize the pairs of
coding rate and key rate (to be formally defined later) with which perfectly
secure, zero-delay, lossless transmission is possible. Two models of eaves-
droppers are considered, which differ in their ability to parse the bit-stream
which is transmitted from Alice to Bob. We continue with the causal source
coding setting, as defined by Neuhoff and Gilbert [1], in which delay is al-
lowed, but the cascade of encoder and decoder must be a causal function
of the source. In this setting, our goal is to characterize the achievable re-
gion of the quadruple composed of rate, distortion, key rate and uncertainty
at the eavesdropper (equivocation, formally defined later). This setting is
later extended to the scenario where side information (SI), correlated to the
source, is available to Bob and Eve. We introduce each of these settings
in more depth and discuss the fundamental difference between them when
secrecy is involved in the sequel after reviewing relevant past work.
Shannon [2] introduced the information-theoretic notion of secrecy, where
secrecy is measured through the remaining uncertainty about the message at
the eavesdropper. This information-theoretic approach of secrecy allows to
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consider secrecy issues at the physical layer, and ensures unconditionally (re-
gardless of the eavesdroppers computing power and time) secure schemes,
since it only relies on the statistical properties of the system. Wyner in-
troduced the wiretap channel in [3] and showed that it is possible to send
information at a positive rate with perfect secrecy as long as Eve’s channel is
a degraded version of the channel to Bob. When the channels are clean, two
approaches can be found in the literature of secure communication. The
first assumes that both Alice and Bob agree on a secret key prior to the
transmission of the source. The second approach assumes that Bob and Eve
(and possibly Alice) have different versions of SI and secrecy is achieved
through this difference.
For the case of shared secret key, Shannon showed that in order for the
transmission of a DMS to be fully secure, the rate of the key must be at least
as large as the entropy of the source. Yamamoto ([4] and references therein)
studied various secure source coding scenarios that include an extension of
Shannon’s result to combine secrecy with rate–distortion theory. In both
[2],[4], when no SI is available, it was shown that separation is optimal.
Namely, using a source code followed by encryption with the shared key is
optimal. The other approach was treated more recently by Prabhakaran
and Ramchandran [5] who considered lossless source coding with SI at both
Bob and Eve when there is no rate constraint between Alice and Bob. It was
shown that the Slepian-Wolf [6] scheme is not necessarily optimal when the
SI structure is not degraded. Coded SI at Bob and SI at Alice was considered
in [7]. These works were extended by Villard and Piantanida [8] to the
case where distortion is allowed and coded SI is available to Bob. Merhav
combined the two approaches with the wire–tap channel [9]. In [10], Schieler
and Cuff considered the tradeoff between rate, key rate and distortions at
the eavesdropper and legitimate decoder when the eavesdropper had causal
access to the source and/or correlated data. Note that we mentioned only a
small sample of the vast literature on this subject. In the works mentioned
above, there were no constraints on the delay and/or causality of the system.
As a result, the coding theorems of the above works introduced arbitrary
long delay and exponential complexity.
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The practical need for fast and efficient encryption algorithms for mil-
itary and commercial applications along with theoretical advances of the
cryptology community, led to the development of efficient encryption al-
gorithms and standards which rely on relatively short keys. However, the
security of these algorithms depend on computational complexity and the
intractability assumption of some hard problems. From the information-
theoretic perspective, very little work has been done on the intersection of
zero-delay or causal source coding and secrecy. A notable exception is [11]
which considered the combination of prefix coding and secrecy1. The figure
of merit in [11] is the expected key consumption where it is assumed that
Alice and Bob can agree on new key bits and use them during the trans-
mission. However, no concrete scheme was given on how these bits will be
generated securely.
For causal source coding, it was shown in [1], that for a discrete mem-
oryless source (DMS), the optimal causal encoder consists of time–sharing
between no more than two memoryless quantizers, followed by entropy cod-
ing. In [13], Weissman and Merhav extended [1] to include SI at the de-
coder, encoder or both. The discussion in [13] was restricted, however, only
to settings where the encoder and decoder could agree on the reconstruction
symbol. In [14] this restriction was dropped. Zero-delay source coding with
SI for both single user and multi-user was also considered in [14].
Without secrecy constraints, the extension of [1] to the zero-delay case
is straightforward and is done by replacing the block entropy coding by in-
stantaneous Huffman coding. The resulting bit-stream between the encoder
and decoder is composed of the Huffman codewords. However, this can-
not be done when secrecy is involved, even if only lossless compression is
considered. To see why, consider the case where Eve intercepts a Huffman
codeword and further assume the bits of the codeword are encrypted with a
one-time pad. While the intercepted bits give no information on the encoded
symbol (since they are independent of it after the encryption), the number
of intercepted bits leaks information on the source symbol. For example, if
the codeword is short, Eve knows that the encrypted symbol is one with a
1[11] was presented in parallel to the ISIT2012 presentation of this paper [12].
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high probability. This suggests that in order to achieve perfect secrecy, the
lengths of the codewords emitted by the encoder should be independent of
the source and that a simple separation scheme as described above for the
causal setting will not achieve perfect secrecy.
In the last example, we assumed that Eve is informed on how to parse
the bit-stream into separate codewords. This will be the case, for example,
when each codeword is transmitted as a packet over a network and the
packets are intercepted by Eve. Even if the bits are meaningless to Eve, she
still knows the number of bits in each packet. Our first contribution in this
paper is to show that, albeit the above example, for the class of encoders
we consider, the key rate can be as low as the average Huffman codeword
length of the source. In contrast to the works mentioned above, our results
here are not asymptotic. Note that the length of the transmission was not
an issue in the previous works mentioned since block coding (with fixed and
known length) was used.
Our second contribution is the analysis of the case where Eve does not
have parsing information and cannot parse the bit-stream into the separate
codewords. This will be the case, for example, if Eve acquires only the
whole bit-stream, not necessarily in real–time, without the log of the network
traffic. Alternatively, it acquires an encrypted file after it was saved to
the disk. In this case, when we assume that the length of transmission
becomes large, we show that the best achievable rates of both the key and
the transmission are given by the Huffman length of the source. In contrast
to the results described in the previous paragraph, the results in this scenario
are asymptotic in the sense that the probability that the system is not secure
vanishes when the transmission length is infinite.
In the last part of this work we revisit the causal setting of [1] and in-
clude secrecy constraints. The entropy coding phase of Neuhoff and Gilbert
[1] makes their scheme impractical. However, their result lower bounds
the optimal zero-delay coding performance and gives us insight on how the
functional causality restriction affect the rate as compared to classical rate-
distortion results (which employ non-causal quantization). Following this,
we explore how the causality restriction affects the region derived by Ya-
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mamoto [4]. Clearly, to achieve secrecy, one can separate the encryption
and source coding. Namely, encrypt the output of the entropy coder in the
cascade of [1] with the key and decrypt before the entropy decoder at the
receiver side. The last contribution of this paper is a proof that the cascade
of [1] is still optimal and the described separation scheme is optimal with
the secrecy constraints. When SI is available, as shown in [14], the cascade
of quatizer and entropy coding is no longer optimal. We show, however,
that in this case as well, separation between source coding and encryption is
optimal. While the direct part of the proof is trivial, since we use separation,
the proof of the converse turns out to be quite involved.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Section 2 we deal
with the zero-delay setting. Section 3 deals with the causal setting where
delay is allowed. Each section starts with a formal definition of the setting.
We conclude this work and point to several possible future directions in
Section 4.
2 Zero-Delay Perfect Secrecy
In this section, we consider the combination of zero-delay source coding and
secrecy. The difference between zero-delay and causal source coding boils
down to the replacement of the entropy coding in the scheme of Neuhoff and
Gilbert [1] with instantaneous coding. However, as the example given in
the Introduction indicates, replacing the entropy coding with instantaneous
coding will result in information leakage to Eve, at least when Eve can
parse the bit-stream and knows the length of each codeword. In the setup we
consider in this section, neither Bob nor Eve have access to SI. The extension
to the case where both Bob and Eve have the same SI is straightforward and
will be discussed in the sequel. We start with notation and formal setting
in Section 2.1. Section 2.2 will deal with the setting where Eve has parsing
information while Section 2.3 will deal with the setting where Eve cannot
parse the bit-stream.
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2.1 Preliminaries
We begin with notation conventions. Capital letters represent scalar random
variables (RV’s), specific realizations of them are denoted by the correspond-
ing lower case letters and their alphabets – by calligraphic letters. For i < j
(i, j - positive integers), xji will denote the vector (xi, . . . , xj), where for
i = 1 the subscript will be omitted. We denote the expectation of a random
variable X by E(X) and its entropy by H(X). For two random variables
X,Y , with finite alphabets X ,Y, respectively and joint probability distribu-
tion P (x, y), the average instantaneous codeword length of X conditioned
on Y = y will be given by
L(X|Y = y) 4= min
l(·)∈AX
{∑
x∈X
P (x|y)l(x)
}
. (1)
where AX is the set of all possible length functions l : X → Z+ that satisfy
Kraft’s inequality for alphabet of size |X |. L(X|Y = y) is obtained by
designing a Huffman code for the probability distribution P (x|y). With
the same abuse of notation common for entropy, we let L(X|Y ) denote
the expectation of L(X|Y = y) with respect to the randomness of Y . The
average Huffman codeword length of X is given by L(X) and will be referred
to as the Huffman length of X. For three random variables X,Y, Z jointly
distributed according to P (x, y, z) We let L(X|y, Z) stand for
L(X|y, Z) 4= L(X|Y = y, Z) =
∑
z
P (z|y)L(X|Y = y, Z = z), (2)
namely, the average Huffman length of X conditioned on (Y = y, Z) where
the expectation is taken with respect to the randomness of Z conditioned
on the event that Y = y. Since more information at both the encoder and
decoder (represented by the conditioning on Y ) cannot increase the optimal
coding rate, we have that L(X|Y ) ≤ L(X), i.e., conditioning reduces the
Huffman length of the source (this can also be easily shown directly from
(1)).
We consider the following zero-delay source coding problem: Alice wishes
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to losslessly transmit the output of a DMS X, distributed according to
P (x), to Bob. The communication between Alice and Bob is intercepted
by Eve. Alice and Bob operate without delay. When Alice observes Xt she
encodes it, possibly using previous source symbols, by an instantaneous code
and transmits the codeword to Bob through a clean digital channel. Bob
decodes the codeword and reproduces Xt. A communication stage is defined
to start when the source emits Xt and ends when Bob reproduces Xt, i.e.,
Bob cannot use future transmissions to calculate Xt. We will assume that
both Alice and Bob share access to a completely random binary sequence,
U = (U1, U2, . . .), which is independent of the source and will be used as
key bits. In addition, Alice has access, at each stage, to a private source
of randomness {Vt}, which is i.i.d and independent of the source and the
key. Neither Bob nor Eve have access to {Vt}. Let m1,m2, . . . ,mn, mi ∈ N
be a non-decreasing sequence of positive integers. At stage t, Alice uses
l(Kt)
4
= mt − mt−1 bits that were not used so far from the key sequence.
Let Kt
4
= (Umt−1+1, . . . , Umt) denote the stage t key. The parsing of the key
sequence up to stage t should be the same for Alice and Bob to maintain
synchronization. This can be done through a predefined protocol where the
key lengths are fixed in advance or “on the fly” through the transmitted data
by a pre-defined protocol (such as detecting a valid codeword). Note that
such a scheme can introduce dependencies between the used keys {Kt} and
the data at the encoder (Xt,Kt−1, V t). Therefore, while U is independent
of all other variables, {Kt} is not and might depend on the encoder’s data
through the number of bits from U it contains. We define the key rate to
be Rk = lim supn→∞
1
n
∑n
t=1El(Kt). Let Z be the set of all finite length
binary strings. Denote Alice’s output at stage t by Zt ∈ Z and let Bt
denote the unparsed sequence, containing l(Bt) bits, that were transmitted
until the end of stage t (note that Bt does not contain parsing information
and therefore is different from Zt). The rate of the encoder is defined by
R
4
= lim supn→∞
1
nEl(Bn). When we write Zt = f(Kt, A,B,C) for some
encoding function f and any random variables (A,B,C), this will mean that
the length of the key, Kt, depend only on A,B,C and not other variables
which are not parameters of f .
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Given the keys up to stage t, Kt, Bob can parse Bn into Z1, . . . , Zt for any
n ≥ t. The legitimate decoder is thus a sequence functions Xt = gt(Kt, Zt).
The model of the system is depicted in Fig. 1.
 
Alice Bob
tK
1 2, ,...,
t
t
B
Z Z Z
Eve
tK
tX tX
?
tV
Figure 1: Zero-delay secrecy model
As discussed in the Introduction, we will treat two secrecy models. In
the first model we will assume that Eve can detect when each stage starts,
i.e., it can parse Bt into Z1, . . . , Zt. In the second model, we will assume
that Eve taps into the bit-stream of a continuous transmission between Alice
and Bob, B
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= B∞1 but has no information on actual parsing of B into the
actual messages, {Zt}. We treat each of the models in detail in the following
subsections.
2.2 Eve Has Parsing Information
In this subsection, we assume that Eve can parse Bn into Z1, Z2, . . . , Zn. In
order for the system to be fully secure, we follow Shannon [2] in defining
what is a secure system.
Definition 1. When Eve has parsing information, a system is said to be
perfectly secured if for any l, k,m, n
P (xkl |znm) = P (xkl ). (3)
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Namely, acquiring any portion of the transmission leaks no information
on any portion of the source, which was not known to Eve in advance.
Parsing information is usually not part of any source coding model (with
the exception of “one shot” models or one-to-one codes [15]). In this sub-
section, however, we assume that Eve has this knowledge. It is important to
note that this is additional information (or side information) that is given
to Eve and, unless it is known in advance (for example if fixed length codes
are used) it generally cannot be deterministically calculated by observing
the encrypted bit-stream which passes from Alice to Bob. The motivation,
as discussed in the Introduction, is that sometimes such side information
can be obtained by Eve through other means, for example a packet sniffer
in a packet network. Moreover, it makes sense to assume that if Eve has
such side information, Bob can acquire it as well (for example Eve gets this
information through a packet sniffer, obviously, Bob will have this informa-
tion as well). It is well known that when a decoder has parsing information,
there is no need to use uniquely decodable (UD) codes and the average rate
of the encoder can be lower than the entropy of the source [15]. However,
it can be easily seen that whenever Eve has parsing information, the rate is
lower bounded by dlog |X |e.
Proposition 1. When Eve has parsing information, if the system is per-
fectly secured then
R ≥ dlog |X |e. (4)
Proof: Since the number of bits composing Zt must be independent of the
source symbols (otherwise the length of Zt will leak information, as in the
example in the Introduction) the parsing information will assist Bob/Eve
to parse the bitstream into Z1, Z2, . . ., but will not assist in interpreting
the code within Zt. Therefore, within each Zt an instantaneous code must
be used (because of the zero delay constraint). By Kraft’s inequality, the
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shortest block that can accommodate a UD code is of length dlog |X |e since
1 ≥
∑
x
2−l(x) ≥
∑
x
2−lmax = |X |2−lmax (5)
where l(x) is the length of the codeword of x ∈ X and lmax is the longest
codeword in the code.
The pessimistic conclusion from Proposition 1 is that there is no hope
for compression in this setting. As we will see in the following, although
such a rate is possible, it will be higher than that, when we will want to
minimize the key rate.
The most general zero-delay encoder is a sequence of functions Zt =
ft(K
t, V t, Xt). In this section, we will treat only a subclass of encoders that
satisfy the Markov chain
Xt ↔ Zt ↔ Kt−1. (6)
Namely, given the past and current encoder outputs, the current source sym-
bol, Xt, does not reduce the uncertainty regarding the past keys. Similarly,
knowing past keys will not assist a cryptanalyst in decrypting the current
source symbol. Namely, the past keys are either not reused, and if reused,
the resulting message is encrypted by new key bits. We claim that this
constraint, in the framework of perfect secrecy with a memoryless source is
relatively benign and, in fact, any encoder that calculates a codeword (possi-
bly using the whole history of the source and keys, i.e., with the most general
encoder structure), say Zˆt, and then outputs Zt = Zˆt ⊕Kt will satisfy this
constraint. Such a structure seems natural for one–time pad encryption. In
fact, it turns out that (6) includes a broad class of encoders and any secure
encoder with the general structure of Zt = ft(Kt, Vt, X
t, Zt−1) satisfies (6).
We show this in Appendix 4. As we will see in the following, although (6)
allows for encoder/decoder which can try to use previously sent source sym-
bols which at stage t are known only to Alice and Bob to reduce the number
of key bits used at stage t, this will not be possible.
The main result of this subsection is the following theorem:
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Theorem 1. In the class of codes that satisfy (6), there exists a pair of
perfectly secure zero-delay encoder and decoder if and only if Rk ≥ L(X).
Remarks:
1) This theorem is in the spirit of the result of [2], where the entropy is re-
placed by the Huffman length due to the zero-delay constraint. As discussed
in the Introduction, variable-rate coding is not an option when we want the
communication to be perfectly secret. This means that the encoder should
either output constant length (short) blocks or have the transmission length
independent of the source symbol in some other way. While by Proposition
1, no compression is possible, Theorem 1 shows that the rate of the key can
be as low as L(X) which is the minimal length for zero delay coding. In the
proof of the direct part of Theorem 1, we show that a constant rate encoder
with block length corresponding to the longest Huffman codeword achieves
this key rate. The padding is done by random bits from the encoder’s private
source of randomness.
2) When Both Bob and Eve has SI, say Yt where (Xt, Yt) are drawn from
a memoryless source emitting pairs, a theorem in the spirit of Theorem 1
can be derived by replacing the Huffman codes by zero-delay zero-error SI
aware codes, which were derived by Alon and Orlitsky in [16]. These codes
also have the property that conditioning reduces their expected length and
therefore the proof will contain the same arguments when (6) will be written
as Xt ↔ (Zt, Y t)↔ Kt−1 (see also [14] for example of these proof techniques
using the codes of [16]).
3) Extending Theorem 1 from lossless to lossy source coding is possible by
replacing X by Xˆ where Xˆ will be the output of a zero-delay reproduc-
tion coder. If the distortion constraint is “per-letter”, then this is straight
forward. If the distortion constraint is on the whole block (as in classical
rate-distortion) then (6) will impose a strong restriction on the reproduction
coder, forcing it to be memoryless (otherwise, knowing past symbols by us-
ing Kt−1 will leak information of the current symbol) . Although zero-delay
rate distortion results suggest that indeed Xˆ should be memoryless (see [1],
[14]), these results do not restrict the reproduction coder to be memoryless
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in advance.
We prove the converse and direct parts of Theorem 1 in following two
subsections, respectively. Theorem 1 only lower bounds the key rate. Clearly
there is a tradeoff between the key rate and the coding rate. We propose an
achievable region in Section 2.2.3.
2.2.1 Converse Part
For every lossless secure encoder–decoder pair that satisfies (6), we lower
bound the key rate as follows:
n∑
t=1
El(Kt) =
n∑
t=1
L(Kt)
≥
n∑
t=1
L(Kt|Kt−1, Zt) (7)
=
n∑
t=1
L(Kt, Xt|Kt−1, Zt) (8)
≥
n∑
t=1
L(Xt|Kt−1, Zt) (9)
=
n∑
t=1
L(Xt|Zt) (10)
=
n∑
t=1
L(Xt) (11)
= nL(X). (12)
The first equality is true since the key bits are incompressible and therefore
the Huffman length is the same as the number of key bits. (7) is true
since conditioning reduces the Huffman length (the simple proof of this
is omitted). (8) follows since Xt is a function of (K
t, Zt) (the decoder’s
function) and therefore, given (Kt−1, Zt), the code for Kt also reveals Xt.
(9) is true since with the same conditioning on (Kt−1, Zt), the instantaneous
code of (Kt, Xt) cannot be shorter then the instantaneous code of Xt. (10)
is due to (6) and finally, (11) is true since we consider a secure encoder. We
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therefore showed that Rk ≥ L(X).
2.2.2 Direct Part
We construct an encoder–decoder pair that are fully secure with Rk = L(X).
Let lH−max denote the longest Huffman codeword of X. We know that
lH−max ≤ |X| − 1. The encoder output will always be lH−max bits long and
will be built from two fields. The first field will be the Huffman codeword
for the observed source symbol Xt. Denote its length by lH(Xt). This
codeword is then XORed with lH(Xt) key bits. The second field will be
composed of lH−max− lH(Xt) random bits (taken from the private source of
randomness) that will pad the encrypted Huffman codeword to be of length
lH−max. Regardless of the specific source output, Eve sees constant length
codewords composed of random uniform bits. Therefore no information
about the source is leaked by the encoder outputs. When Bob receives such
a block, it starts XORing it with key bits until it detects a valid Huffman
codeword. The rest of the bits are ignored. Obviously, the key rate which
is needed is L(X).
2.2.3 Achievable Region
The direct proof shown above, suggests a single point on the R−Rk plane.
Namely, the point where Rk = L(X) (its minimal possible value), but the
encoder rate is high and is equal to lH−max. However, there are many other
achievable points which can be shown using the same idea as in the direct
part of the proof by replacing the Huffman code by another instantaneous
code. For every possible instantaneous code for the source X (not necessarily
optimal code for this source) we can repeat the arguments of the direct part
of the proof by setting the rate (block length) to be the longest codeword in
this code and the XORing only the bits which originate from this code while
padding the remainder of the block with random bits. Any such code, which
is a sub-optimal code for source coding, will give us an operating point in
the R−Rk plane. The extreme case is obtained by using the trivial source
code which uses dlog |X |e bits for all symbols and XORing all the bits with
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key bits. Since there is only a finite number of possible instantaneous codes
(when not counting codes that artificially enlarge the description of shorter
codes by adding bits) we will get a finite number of points in the R − Rk
plane. The lower convex envelope of these points is achievable by time-
sharing. This is illustrated in Fig. 2. We see an interesting phenomenon
where optimal codes for source coding (e.g, Huffman code) will achieve high
encoding rates (albeit low key rate) while sub-optimal codes will achieve low
encoding rate (but higher key rate).
R
Rk
L(X )
lH−max⌈log∣X∣⌉
⌈log∣X∣⌉
Figure 2: Achievable region
2.3 Eve Has No Parsing Information
In this subsection, we relax our secrecy requirements and assume that Eve
observes the whole transmission from Alice to Bob, but has no information
on how to parse the bit-stream Bn into Z1, . . . , Zn. Note that we did not
restrict the eavesdropper in any way since parsing information is generally
not available and cannot be calculated from Bn. Moreover, this setting has
a practical motivation, as discussed in the Introduction.
Note that although Eve has no parsing information, she still knows the
length of the whole bit-stream, which can still leak information on the source.
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For example, suppose Alice uses a prefix code that has a 1 bit codeword
length for, say, X = a and sends n symbols to Bob. Even if the bit-stream
is encrypted with a one time pad (and therefore not parsable by Eve by our
assumptions) but Eve sees that the total length of the bit-stream is exactly
n bits, she knows with certainty that all the symbols in the bit-stream are
a. While such a system is not secure by Definition 1, the probability of
the described event vanishes exponentially fast. In this section, we have a
relaxed definition of secrecy which allows for encoders that leak information
on the source, but with vanishing probability:
Definition 2. When Eve has no parsing information, we say that the system
is asymptotically secure if the following holds for every t ≤ n and every
x ∈ X :
P (Xt = x|Bn) −−−→
n→∞ PX(Xt = x) a.s. (13)
This means that when the bit-stream is long enough, the eavesdropper
does not learn from it anything about the source symbols with probability
1. Note that the encoder from Section 2.2.2 trivially satisfies this constraint
since it was a constant block length encoder and the bits within the block
where encrypted by a one–time pad. We will see that with the relaxed
secrecy requirement we can reduce the rate of the encoder to be the same
as the rate of the key. As in the previous subsection, where we dealt with
encoders satisfying (6), here, we will limit the discussion as well. We will
treat only encoders that satisfy
lim
n→∞ max1≤t≤n(1−)
‖P (xt|Bn, kt−1)− P (xt|Bn)‖1 = 0 a.s. (14)
where ‖P − Q‖1 denotes the variational distance between the probability
measures, ‖P −Q‖1 =
∑
x |P (x)−Q(x)|. This constraint means that when
n is large, for all t for which a gap remains to the end of the bit-stream, we
practically have the Markov chain as in (6) with Zn replaced by Bn. Note
that this requirement is less stringent than (6) and in fact any encoder which
satisfies (6) and is secure with parsing information (i.e., satisfies definition
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1) will satisfy (14). Since Bt can be parsed with K
t, the margin between
t and n in (14) ensures that for any t considered, there is a portion of Bn
that cannot be parsed, even if the eavesdropper acquired the previous keys.
The discussion that followed the constraint (6) is valid here as well, namely,
we only consider encoders that do not reuse old key bits to encrypt new
messages.
We have the following theorem:
Theorem 2. In the class of codes that satisfy (14), there exists a pair of
asymptotically secure, zero-delay, encoder and decoder if and only if R ≥
L(X), Rk ≥ L(X).
The fact that R ≥ L(X) is trivial since we deal with a zero-delay lossless
encoder. However, unlike the case of Theorem 1, here it can be achieved
along with Rk ≥ L(X). Note that if instead of defining the secrecy con-
straint as in (13), we required that for every n, t, P (Xt|Bn) = P (Xt) then
a counterpart of Theorem 1 will hold here. However, the encoder will, as in
the proof of the direct part of Theorem 1, operate at constant rate. We prove
the converse and direct parts of Theorem 2 in the following two subsections,
respectively.
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2.3.1 Converse Part
Following the arguments of Section 2.2.1, we have:
n∑
t=1
El(Kt) =
n∑
t=1
L(Kt)
≥
n∑
t=1
L(Kt|Bn,Kt−1)
=
n∑
t=1
L(Kt, Xt|Bn,Kt−1)
≥
n∑
t=1
L(Xt|Bn,Kt−1)
≥
n(1−)∑
t=1
L(Xt|Bn,Kt−1). (15)
Now, let us define Bn =
{
bn : max1≤t≤n(1−) ‖P (xt|bn, kt−1)− P (xt|bn)‖1 ≤ , ∀kt−1
}
.
It can be immediately seen that for bn ∈ Bn,
L(Xt|bn,Kt−1) ≥ L(Xt|bn)− |X |lmax. (16)
where lmax is the longest codeword for X, whose length can be bounded by
|X |. Using the definition given in (2), we continue as follows:
n∑
t=1
El(Kt) ≥
n(1−)∑
t=1
L(Xt|Bn,Kt−1)
≥
n(1−)∑
t=1
∑
bn∈Bn
P (bn)L(Xt|bn,Kt−1)
≥
n(1−)∑
t=1
∑
bn∈Bn
P (bn)L(Xt|bn)− n(1− )|X|lmax (17)
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We now define Cn = {bn : ‖P (xt|bn)− P (xt)‖1 ≤ } and continue as follows
n∑
t=1
El(Kt) ≥
n(1−)∑
t=1
∑
bn∈Bn
P (bn)L(Xt|bn)− n(1− )|X|lmax
≥
n(1−)∑
t=1
∑
bn∈Bn∩Cn
P (bn)L(Xt|bn)− n(1− )|X|lmax
≥
n(1−)∑
t=1
∑
bn∈Bn∩Cn
P (bn)L(Xt)− 2n(1− )|X|lmax
= n(1− )P (Bn ∩ Cn)L(X)− 2n(1− )|X|lmax (18)
Now since by (13) and (14) we have that P (Bn ∩ Cn)→ 1 for any  > 0 we
showed that
Rk = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
n∑
t=1
ElKt ≥ L(X). (19)
2.3.2 Direct Part
The direct part of the proof is achieved by separation. We show that the
simplest memoryless encoder that encodesXt using a Huffman code and then
XORs the resulting bits with a one time pad is optimal here. Therefore, both
the coding rate and the key rate of this scheme are equal to L(X). Note that
with such a simple encoder, no prior knowledge of n is needed and therefore
such an encoder is suitable for real-time streaming applications. We need
to show that (13) holds.
We outline the idea before giving the formal proof. The bits of Bn are
independent of Xt since we encrypted them with a one-time pad. Therefore,
only the total length of the bit-stream can leak information. Let l(Bn)
represent the number of bits in Bn. By the strong law of large numbers,
1
n l(Bn) → L(X) a.s. But if l(Bn) ≈ nL(X) then the only thing that Eve
learns is that Xn is typical (or equivalently that the law of large number is
working) and this, of course, is known in advance. There are events where
Eve can indeed learn a lot from the length of Bn, but the probability of
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these events vanish as n becomes large.
We invoke martingale theory [17] for a formal proof. Note that Bn can
be written as Bn = (l(Bn), Vn), where Vn is uniform over
{
1, 2, . . . , 2l(Bn)
}
and is the number which is represented by the bits of Bn (in base 2). Given
l(Bn), Vn is independent of X
n since all bits are encrypted. Therefore, we
have the following chain Xt ↔ l(Bn)↔ Bn. Now, since l(Bn) is a function
of Bn, we have that P (Xt|Bn) = P (Xt|Bn, l(Bn)) = P (Xt|l(Bn)).
Let Yt = lH(Xt) where lH(Xt) represents the Huffman codeword length
associated with Xt. Clearly, l(Bn) =
∑n
i=1 Yi. Also for x ∈ X define the
indicator It(x) = 1 {Xt = x}. Finally, define the filtration
F−n = σ {l(Bn), l(Bn+1), . . . } (20)
Since the Yi-s are independent and since the events in F−∞ (which depend
on {Yi}∞i=1) are invariant to a finite permutation of the indexes of the Yi−s,
we have by the Hewitt-Savage zero–one law [17, Theorem 4.1.1, p. 162] that
F∞, where F−∞ = ∩nF−n, is trivial. Namely, if A ∈ F−∞, P (A) ∈ {0, 1}.
For n ≥ t, let Mn = E [It(x)|F−n]. Note that Mn is a bounded (re-
verse) martingale which converges almost surely to M∞ as n → ∞. Since
the source is memoryless and since n ≥ t, we have that It(x) is inde-
pendent of Yn+1, Yn+1,... and therefore given l(Bn), Xt is independent of
l(Bn+1), l(Bn+2), . . .. Thus we have thatMn = E [It(x)|l(Bn), l(Bn+1), . . .] =
P (Xt = x|l(Bn)). Also note that Mn does not depend on t, since due to
symmetry, P (Xt = x|l(Bn)) = P (X1 = x|l(Bn)). This allows us to consider
not only finite t, but also t ≤ n that grow with n to infinity.
Finally, the fact that F∞ is trivial implies that M∞ is a constant, which
is the expectation of the indicator, i.e., P (Xt = x). We therefore showed
that P (Xt = x|l(Bn))→ P (Xt = x) a.s.
To see that this encoder satisfies (14) note that
P (Xt = xt|Bn, kt−1) = P (Xt = xt|Bt,n, xt−1)
= P (Xt = xt|Bt,n)
= P (Xt = xt|l(Bn)− l(Bt−1)) (21)
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where Bt,n denotes the bit-stream starting from time t until time n. The
last equation is true since we have that Xt ↔ l(Bn)− l(Bt−1)↔ Bt,n Now,
for t ≤ (1 − )n, the analysis we did above for P (Xt = xt|Bn) is valid here
(with a time shift of t ) since l(Bn)− l(Bt−1) grows as n grows and therefore
(14) is satisfied.
3 Causal Rate-Distortion with Secrecy Constraints
In this section, we extend [1],[13],[14] to include secrecy constraints. Un-
like the discussion of Section 2, here we will allow lossy reconstruction and
imperfect secrecy.
As in any source coding work, we will be interested in the encoder rate
R and the minimal distortion, D which is attained with this rate. With
the addition of secrecy constraints, two more figures of merit will be added.
The first is the uncertainty h, (measured by equivocation, to be defined
shortly) at the eavesdropper regarding the source. The second is the rate of
a private key, Rk, shared by Alice and Bob with which a given uncertainty
h, is achievable. Note that when D > 0, Bob is also left with uncertainty
regarding the original source sequence since he only knows it is contained
in a D-ball around its reconstruction. Therefore, even with no attempt
of encryption, Eve will “suffer” this same uncertainty. This implies that
(R,Rk, h,D) are tied together and the goal of this section is to find the
region of attainable quadruples.
Our system model is depicted in Fig. 3.
We will deal with two settings, which differ by the position of the switches
denoted by S in Fig. 3. Namely, the availability of SI at Bob and Eve. While
the setting without SI is a special case of the setting which includes SI, these
settings are different from a causal rate-distortion standpoint. Without SI,
it was shown in [1] that the chain of encoder and decoder is equivalent to
chain of a causal reproduction coder (to be formally defined shortly) followed
by lossless compression. However, when SI is available to the decoder, this
equivalence does not hold since the encoder cannot reproduce Xˆ without
the SI. The next two subsections deal with the two settings, starting from
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Figure 3: Causal Model
the simpler case without SI. Formal definition of the settings will be given
in the beginning of each subsection.
3.1 Causal Secrecy Without SI
3.1.1 Preliminaries
The notation conventions we introduced in the beginning of Section 2.1
for random variables, vectors etc., will be used here as well. Let Xn be a
sequence produced by a memoryless source. The alphabet of X, X , as well
as all other alphabets in the sequel, is finite. The source sequence is given
to Alice. In addition to the source, Alice has access to a secret key, K,
uniformly distributed over {1, 2, . . . ,Mk}, which is independent of Xn. Bob
shares the same key. Alice uses the source and the key to create a binary
representation Z = {Zk}k≥1 (we omit the dependence of Z on n to simplify
notation). Bob receivesZ and with its shared key creates a reproduction Xˆn,
where Xˆ ∈ Xˆ is the reproduction alphabet. As in [1], the cascade of encoder
and decoder will be referred as a reproduction coder, i.e., the reproduction
coder is a family of functions {fk}k≥1 such that Xˆk = fk(Xn,K).
We say that a reproduction function is causal relative to the source if
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for all t:
Xˆt = ft(X
∞
−∞,K) = ft(X˜
∞
−∞,K) if X
t
−∞ = X˜
t
−∞. (22)
We are given a distortion measure d, d : X × Xˆ → R+ where R+ denotes
the set of non-negative real numbers. Let Dmin = minx,xˆ d(x, xˆ). When a
source code with a given induced reproduction coder {fk} is applied to the
source Xn, the average distortion is defined by
D({fk}) 4= lim sup
n→∞
1
n
E
n∑
t=1
d(Xt, Xˆt). (23)
Let l(Z) denote the number of bits in the bitstream Z. The average rate of
the encoder is defined by
R = lim sup
n→∞
1
n
El(Z). (24)
In our model, an eavesdropper, Eve, intercepts the bitstream Z. We
follow the common assumptions that Eve is familiar with the encoding and
decoding functions, coding techniques, etc., which are employed by Alice
and Bob, but is unaware of the actual realizations of the source and the key.
The uncertainty regarding the source sequence X at the eavesdropper after
intercepting Z is measured by the per-letter equivocation, which we denote
by h. Namely, h = lim infn→∞ 1nH(X
n|Z).
Unlike [1], [13], where the bit representation which is passed from the
encoder to the decoder, Z, was only an intermediate step between a lossless
encoder and a lossless decoder, here, Z is important as it should leave Eve
as oblivious as possible of the source sequence. However, as in [1], [13],
applying a lossless code on Z between the encoder and decoder can only
improve the coding rate and will not affect the other figures of merit.
Let RNO−SI denote the set of positive quadruples (R,Rk, D, h) such
that for every  > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists an encoder and a
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decoder, inducing a causal reproduction coder and satisfying:
1
n
H(Z) ≤ R+ , (25)
1
n
H(K) ≤ Rk + , (26)
1
n
n∑
t=1
Ed(Xt, Xˆt) ≤ D + , (27)
1
n
H(Xn|Z) ≥ h− . (28)
Our goal, in this section, is to find the region of quadruples, which are
achievable with a causal reproduction coder. To this end, we will need pre-
vious results on causal rate-distortion results [1], which we briefly describe
below.
In [1], the same model as described above was considered without the
secrecy constraints. The goal of [1] was to find the tradeoff between R and
D under the constraint that the reproduction coder is causal. Towards this
goal, the equivalence of the two models in Fig. 4 was proved. Namely, the
rate of a source code with a given reproduction coder can be only improved
if a lossless source code will be applied to its output. This implied that
it is enough to consider only systems that first, generate the reproduction
processes and then losslessly encode it as is Fig. 4b. Indeed, this separation
is the basis for many practical coding systems.
Let Rc(D) denote the minimal achievable rate over all causal reproduc-
tion coders {fk} with d({fk}) ≤ D. Also, let
rc(D) = min
f :Ed(X,f(X)≤D
H(f(X)) (29)
and finally, let rc(D) denote the lower convex envelope of rc(D) The follow-
ing theorem is the main result of [1]:
Theorem 3. ([1], Theorem 3)
Rc(D) = rc(D). (30)
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Figure 4: Causal source coding model
It was shown in [1] that rc(D) is achieved by time-sharing no more than
two scalar reproduction coders.
3.1.2 Characterizing RNO−SI
Although a scheme that first uses the optimal encoder of [1] to create the
same bit-stream and then XOR the resulting bits with key bits is obviously
possible, it is not immediately clear that such a separation is optimal. The
reason for this is that one needs to first rule out the possibility that using
key bits during the quantization and using entropy coding with the key as
SI at both sides might improve performance. The following theorem, which
is the main result of this subsection, shows that the separation scheme is
indeed optimal.
Theorem 4. (R,Rk, D, h) ∈ RNO−SI if and only if the following inequali-
ties hold:
R ≥ rc(D)
h ≤ H(X)
Rk ≥ h−H(X) + rc(D) (31)
It is evident from Theorem 4 that the direct part is achieved by the
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separation scheme proposed above. Theorem 4 is a special case of the more
general theorem, which includes SI, we prove in the next subsection (Theo-
rem 6) and therefore no proof is given here2.
3.2 Causal Secrecy with Side Information
In this section, we extend the setting of Section 3.1 to include SI at Bob
and Eve. As in the previous section, we start by describing the model and
mentioning related causal rate-distortion results before giving our results.
In this section, we assume a memoryless source which emits sequences of
random variables (Xn, Y n,Wn). As before, Xn is observed by Alice. Bob
and Eve observe Y n, Wn respectively. The sequences (Xn, Y n,Wn) are
distributed according to a joint distribution
P (xn, yn, wn) =
n∏
t=1
P (xt)P (yt|xt)P (wt|yt).
Namely, we assume a degraded SI structure where Bob’s SI is better than
Eve’s SI. Although we do not deal with other possible SI structures, we will
discuss such extensions in the sequel. As in the model without SI, Alice and
Bob have access to a shared secret key denoted by K, K ∈ {0, 1, 2 . . . ,Mk}
which is independent of the source. Alice sends a binary representation
Z = {Zk}k≥1 which is used by the decoder along with the SI and key
to create Xˆn. We call the cascade of encoder and decoder a reproduction
coder, namely a family of functions {fk}k≥1 such that Xˆk = fk(K,Xn, Y n).
A reproduction coder is said to be causal with respect to the source and SI
if for all t:
ft(k, x
n, yn) = ft(k, u
t, vt), if xt = ut, yt = vt (32)
The distortion constraint (23) and the definition of rate (24) remain the same
as in the setting without SI. When SI is available to the decoder, the cascade
2The achieving scheme of Theorem 4 will use the coding scheme of [1] instead of the
coding scheme of [14] which is used to prove Theorem 6, but the ideas are essentially the
same.
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of encoder and decoder cannot be a recast into a cascade of reproduction
coder followed by lossless coding as in Fig. 4 since the encoder has no access
to the SI the decoder uses improve its reproduction and therefore cannot
calculate Xˆt. A causal reproduction coder in our setting is composed of a
family of causal encoding functions which calculate messages, St, which are
causal functions of the source symbols, namely St = et(K,X
t) and causal
decoding functions which use the encoder messages along with the SI and
key to create the reproduction, namely, Xˆt = gt(K,S
t, Y t). Note that this
representation stems directly from the causality restriction and every system
that induces a causal reproduction coder can be written in this way3. As
in [1], although forcing causal encoding and decoding functions, this model
allows for arbitrary delays which can be introduced when transmitting the
encoder’s output, Sn, to the decoder. Namely, Z is not necessarily causal
in Sn. We will allow events where the decoder fails to decode the bit-
stream Z to produce the encoder messages, Sn. In such an event, we have
no restriction on the dependence of the output on the SI (and therefore
on the source). However, we restrict that such error events will happen
with small probability. Namely, we require that for every  > 0, P (Sn 6=
g(K,Y n,Z)) <  for large enough n and some function g.
The secrecy of the system is measured by the uncertainty of Eve with
regard to the source sequence, measured by the normalized equivocation
1
nH(X
n|Wn,Z).
Let RSI denote the set of positive quadruples (R,Rk, D, h) such that for
every  > 0 and sufficiently large n, there exists an encoder and a decoder
3The causality restriction does not actually force that St will be a function of X
t as
long as when reproducing Xˆt, only Si’s which are functions of (X1, X2, . . . , Xt) are used.
However, such an “out of order” system has an equivalent system which is obtained by
reordering the indexes of the messages so that Si is a function of X
i. The performance of
both systems will be equivalent since the reordering does not affect the neither the entropy
coding of Sn nor the calculation of Xˆt
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inducing a causal reproduction coder satisfying:
1
n
H(Z) ≤ R+ , (33)
1
n
H(K) ≤ Rk + , (34)
1
n
n∑
t=1
Ed(Xt, Xˆt) ≤ D + , (35)
1
n
H(Xn|Wn,Z) ≥ h− . (36)
Our goal is to characterize this region.
In the context of causal source coding, such a model was considered
in [13], [14]. In [13] the model was restricted to common reconstruction
between the encoder and decoder, meaning that both parties agree on the
reconstruction. This restriction prevents the decoder from using the SI
when reconstructing the source and the SI can be used only for lossless
transmission of the reconstruction which is calculated at the encoder. In
this case, a cascade of a reproduction coder followed by lossless entropy
coding which uses SI is valid. The full treatment of SI for this scenario was
recently given in [14].
Let RSIc (D) denote the minimal achievable rate over all causal repro-
duction coders with access to SI, {fk}, such that D {fk} ≤ D. Also let
rSIc (D) = min
f,g
H(f(X)|Y ) (37)
where the minimum is over all functions f : X → S and g : S ×Y → Xˆ such
that Ed(X, g(f(X), Y )) ≤ D. The alphabet S is a finite alphabet whose
size is part of the optimization process (|S| ≤ |X |). Finally, let rSIc (D) be
the lower convex envelope of rSIc (D).
The following theorem is proved in [14]:
Theorem 5. ([14], Theorem 4)
RSIc (D) = rSIc (D) (38)
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It was shown that rSIc (D) is achieved by time-sharing at most two sets
of scalar encoders (f) and decoders (g). Moreover, SI lookahead was shown
to be useless in the causal setting.
3.3 Characterizing RSI
We have the following theorem.
Theorem 6. (R,Rk, D, h) ∈ RSI if and only if
R ≥ rSIc (D),
h ≤ H(X|W ),
Rk ≥ h−H(X|W ) + rSIc (D). (39)
If h−H(X|W ) + rSIc (D) ≤ 0, no encryption is needed.
Remark: The above theorem pertains to degraded SI structure. It was
shown in [5] that for lossless secure compression with SI, Slepian-Wolf cod-
ing is optimal when the SI is degraded, but not optimal otherwise. For a
general SI structure, a simple scheme will apply memoryless quantization
(resulting in a new memoryless source) and then apply the scheme of [5].
The output of the scheme of [5] can be further encrypted with key bits as
needed to achieve the desired h. Such a scheme will not violate the causal
restriction. Although schemes that first apply memoryless quantization and
then losslessly compress the output are optimal in the context of all known
causal source coding works, it is not clear that this is the case here. The
challenge in the converse part is that when applying a causal encoder (but
not memoryless), the resulting process is not necessarily memoryless. We
were unsuccessful in proving the converse for a general SI structure.
We prove the converse and direct parts of Theorem 6 in the following
two subsections, respectively.
3.3.1 Converse Part
We now proceed to prove the converse part, starting with lower bounding
the encoding rate. We assume a given encoder and decoder pair which form
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a causal reproduction coder with (R,Rk, D, h) ∈ RSI . By the definition of
our model we have by Fano’s inequality ([18]) that H(Sn|K,Y n,Z) ≤ n.
For n large enough and every encoder and decoder pair that induce a
causal reproduction coder and satisfy (33)-(36) the following chain of in-
equalities hold:
nR ≥ H(Z)
≥ H(Z|K,Y n)−H(Z|K,Sn, Y n)
= I(Sn;Z|K,Y n)
= H(Sn|K,Y n)−H(Sn|K,Y n,Z)
≥ H(Sn|K,Y n)− n (40)
=
n∑
t=1
H(St|K,St−1, Y n)− n
≥
n∑
t=1
H(St|K,St−1, Xt−1, Y n)− n
=
n∑
t=1
H(St|K,Xt−1, Y n)− n (41)
=
n∑
t=1
H(et(K,X
t−1, Xt)|K,Xt−1, Y n)− n
=
n∑
t=1
∫
H(et(Xt, k, x
t−1)|k, xt−1, yt−1, Yt, Y nt+1)dµ(k, xt−1, yt−1)− n
(42)
=
n∑
t=1
∫
H(et(Xt, k, x
t−1)|Yt)dµ(k, xt−1, yt−1)− n (43)
where (40) follows from Fano’s inequality and in (41) we used the fact that
St−1 is a function of (K,Xt−1). In (42), µ(·) denotes the joint probability
mass function of its arguments. In the last line, we used the independence
of Xt from the key and SI at time other then t. Now, et(Xt, k, x
t−1) can be
seen as a specific function, f , in the definition of rSIc (D) (37). Also, with
(k, xt−1, yt−1) fixed, so is st−1 and the decoding function
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Xˆt = gt(k, s
t−1, St, yt−1, Yt) can be seen as a specific choice of g(·, ·) in (37).
With this observation, we continue as follows
n(R+ ) ≥
n∑
t=1
∫
H(et(Xt, k, x
t−1)|Yt)dµ(k, xt−1, yt−1)
≥
n∑
t=1
∫
rSIc (E[d(Xt, gt(et(k, x
t−1, Xt), st−1, yt−1, Yt))|k, xt−1, yt−1])×
dµ(k, xt−1, yt−1) (44)
≥
n∑
t=1
∫
rSIc (E[d(Xt, gt(et(k, x
t−1, Xt), st−1, yt−1, Yt))|k, xt−1, yt−1])×
dµ(k, xt−1, yt−1) (45)
≥
n∑
t=1
rSIc
(∫
E[d(Xt, ht(et(k, x
t−1, Xt), st−1, yt−1, Yt))|k, xt−1, yt−1])×
dµ(k, xt−1, yt−1
)
(46)
≥
n∑
t=1
rSIc (E[d(Xt, ht(et(K,X
t), St−1, Y t))])
=
n∑
t=1
rSIc
(
E
[
d(Xt, Xˆt)
])
≥ nrSIc
(
1
n
n∑
t=1
E
[
d(Xt, Xˆt)
])
(47)
≥ nrSIc (D) , (48)
where (44) follows from the definition of rSIc (D) and the discussion preceding
the last equation block, (45) follows from the definition of rSIc (D), (46) and
(47) follow from the convexity of rSIc (D). Finally, (48) follows from the fact
that rSIc (D) is non-increasing in D.
The key rate can be lower bounded as follows:
nRk = H(K)
≥ H(K|Z,Wn)
= I(Xn;K|Wn,Z) +H(K|Xn,Wn,Z)
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= H(Xn|Wn,Z)−H(Xn|K,Wn,Z) +H(K|Xn,Wn,Z)
≥ nh−H(Xn|K,Wn,Z) +H(K|Xn,Wn,Z)
≥ nh−H(Xn|K,Wn,Z) (49)
where the line preceding the last is true due to (36). We continue by focusing
on H(Xn|K,Wn,Z):
H(Xn|K,Wn,Z)
= I(Xn;Y n|K,Wn,Z) +H(Xn|K,Y n,Wn,Z)
≤ H(Y n|Wn)−H(Y n|K,Xn,Wn,Z) +H(Xn|K,Y n,Z) (50)
= H(Y n|Wn)−H(Y n|Xn,Wn) +H(Xn|K,Y n,Z) (51)
= I(Xn;Y n|Wn) +H(Xn|K,Y n, Sn,Z)
+ I(Xn;Sn|K,Y n,Z)
= I(Xn;Y n|Wn) +H(Xn|K,Y n, Sn,Z)
+H(Sn|K,Y n,Z)−H(Sn|K,Xn, Y n,Z)
≤ nI(X;Y |W ) +H(Xn|K,Y n, Sn,Z) + n (52)
≤ n(H(X|W )−H(X|Y )) +H(Xn|K,Y n, Sn) (53)
where in (50) we used the degraded structure of the source. Eq. (51) is
true since Z is a function of (K,Xn) and K is independent of the source.
Eq. (52) is true by Fano’s inequality and the fact that Sn is a function of
(K,Xn). Focusing on the last term of (53) we have
H(Xn|K,Y n, Sn) = H(Xn|K,Y n)− I(Xn;Sn|K,Y n)
= nH(X|Y )− I(Xn;Sn|K,Y n)
= nH(X|Y )−H(Sn|K,Y n) +H(Sn|K,Xn, Y n)
= nH(X|Y )−H(Sn|K,Y n) (54)
≤ nH(X|Y )− nrSIc (D) + n (55)
where (54) is true since Wn is a function of K,Xn. Finally, the last line
follows from (40). Combining (55) with (53) into (49), and using the arbi-
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trariness of , we showed that Rk ≥ h−H(X|W ) + rSIc (D).
3.3.2 Direct Part
It is seen from Theorem 6, that separation holds in this case. The direct
part of this proof is therefore straightforward: First, we apply the achieving
scheme which achieves Theorem 5 and was presented in [14]. Namely, we
find at most two encoding functions, f1, f2, along with the corresponding
two decoding functions that use the SI, g1, g2, which achieve average distor-
tion not greater than D+ . We apply the encoding functions to the source
sequence with the appropriate time sharing to create the encoder messages,
Sn. A Slepian-Wolf code is then applied on Sn. Let the resulting binary
representation of the Slepian-Wolf codeword be denoted by B. By construc-
tion, we have that H(B) ≤ rSIc (D) +  for n large enough. We now XOR
the first n[h−H(X|W ) + rSIc (D)] bits of B with a one time pad K of this
length, creating the binary sequence Z which is given to the decoder. We
have
1
n
H(K) = h−H(X|W ) + rSIc (D) (56)
1
n
H(Z) ≤ rSIc (D) + . (57)
At the decoder, the Slepian-Wolf code is decoded (with failure probability
smaller than  for large enough n) and the decoding functions g1, g2 are
applied on Sn and the SI to create the reproduction. We need to show that
the equivocation constraint is indeed satisfied with this scheme:
H(Xn|Wn,Z) = H(Xn|Wn)− I(Xn,Z|Wn)
= nH(X|W )−H(Z|Wn) +H(Z|Xn,Wn)
≥ nH(X|W )−H(Z) +H(Z|B, Xn,Wn)
= nH(X|W )−H(Z) +H(B ⊕K|B) (58)
= nH(X|W )−H(Z) +H(K)
≥ n(h− ) (59)
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where in (58) we used the fact that by construction we have the following
chain Wn → Xn → B → Z. In (59), we used (57) and (59). Note that
when the decoding of the Slepian-Wolf code fails, the resulting (arbitrary)
reconstruction sequence depends non-causally on the SI, thus breaking the
causal reproduction coder structure. However, the probability of such event
can be made negligible when n becomes large.
4 Conclusion
We investigated the intersection between causal and zero-delay source cod-
ing and information theoretic secrecy. It was shown that simple separation
is optimal in the causal setting when we considered encoder and decoder
pairs that are causal only with respect to the source. An interesting ex-
tension will be to investigate the setting where the use of the key is also
restricted to be causal, for example when the key is streamed along with
the source and should not be be stored. This will force the quantizer to en-
crypt the resulting sequence before the lossless code (see [19] for example).
In the zero-delay setting we considered only perfect secrecy. An interesting
and algorithmically challenging research direction is to investigate imperfect
secrecy in the zero-delay setting. Moreover, it was mentioned that the ex-
tension of our zero-delay results to the case when the same SI is available
to Bob and Eve is straightforward. This will continue to hold when even
if Bob and Eve have different versions of SI but P (w, y) > 0 for all w, y,
where W is Eve’s SI and Y is Bob’s SI. However, when imperfect secrecy is
considered, it is not clear how different SI affects the equivocation at Eve.
Such a setting is another direction for future research.
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Appendix
Proof of Markov chain
We show that any secure encoder that satisfies Zt = f(Kt, Vt, X
t, Zt−1)
satisfies the Markov chain. To see why this is true observe that
P (kt−1, xt, zt) = P (zt)P (xt|zt)P (kt−1|xt, zt) (60)
Focusing on P (kt−1|xt, zt) we have
P (kt−1|xt, zt) = P (k
t−1, xt, zt−1)P (zt|kt−1, xt, zt−1)
P (xt, zt)
=
P (kt−1, xt, zt−1)P (zt|kt−1, xt, zt−1)
P (xt, zt)
(61)
=
P (kt−1, zt−1)P (xt)P (zt|xt, zt−1)
P (xt, zt)
(62)
=
P (kt−1, zt−1)P (xt)P (zt|zt−1)
P (xt)P (zt|xt) (63)
=
P (kt−1, zt−1)P (zt|zt−1)
P (zt−1)P (zt|zt−1)
= P (kt−1|zt−1) (64)
where in (61) we note that xt−1 can be computed from zt−1, kt−1. In (62) we
used the independence of (kt, vt) from k
t−1 and the fact that zt is a function
of (kt, vt, x
t). The independence of xt from (k
t−1, zt−1) was also used. In
(63) we used the secure encoder assumption (independence of Xt from Zt).
Therefore we have,
P (kt−1, xt, zt) = P (xt, zt)P (kt−1|xt, zt)
= P (xt, z
t)P (kt−1|zt) (65)
and we proved that (6) is satisfied.
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